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EXPONENTIAL UTILITY WITH NON-NEGATIVE
CONSUMPTION
ROMAN MURAVIEV AND MARIO V. WU¨THRICH
DEPARTMENT OF MATHEMATICS AND RISKLAB
ETH ZURICH
Abstract. This paper investigates various aspects of the discrete-time ex-
ponential utility maximization problem with non-negative consumption. Us-
ing the Kuhn-Tucker theorem and the notion of aggregate state price density
(Malamud and Trubowitz (2007)), we provide a solution to this problem in the
setting of both complete and incomplete markets (with random endowments).
Then, we exploit this result to provide an explicit characterization of complete
market heterogeneous equilibria. Furthermore, we construct concrete exam-
ples of models admitting multiple (including infinitely many) equilibria. By
using Cramer’s large deviation theorem, we study the asymptotics of equi-
librium zero coupon bonds. Lastly, we conduct a study of the precautionary
savings motive in incomplete markets.
1. Introduction
Utility maximization constitutes a primary field of research in financial math-
ematics, since it offers a well-posed methodology for studying decision making
under uncertainty. The most prevalently used classes of utilities to depict pref-
erences are CRRA (constant relative risk-aversion) and CARA (constant absolute
risk-aversion). Focusing on the latter class, we investigate various aspects of the
corresponding maximization problem with a rather economically viable constraint:
consumption levels are not allowed to take negative values.
CARA (or, exponential) utilities have attracted a great deal of attention during
the last several decades. Concretely, they have been employed in diverse appli-
cations in finance and insurance such as indifference pricing (Frei and Schweizer
(2008), Henderson (2009), and Frei et al. (2011)), incomplete markets with portfo-
lio constraints (Svensson and Werner (1993)) and asset pricing in equilibrium (e.g.
Christensen et al. (2011a, b)). Many researchers allow for negative consumption
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when studying exponential utility maximization (see e.g. Caballero (1990), Chris-
tensen et al. (2011a, b), and Svensson and Werner (1993)). Solely for the purpose
of alleviating complications caused by randomness of market models, negative levels
of consumption lack any other adequate justification. More bluntly, the negativity
of consumption is artificially introduced to obtain tractable solutions in the associ-
ated consumption/investment maximization problem. Most authors, are aware of
this drawback. For instance, Caballero (1990) writes: ”This paper specializes to
this type of preferences (exponential) in spite of some of its unpleasant features
like the possibility of negative consumption. (Unfortunately, explicitly imposing
non-negativity constraints impedes finding a tractable solution.)”. Nonetheless, it is
demonstrated in the current paper that it makes sense to impose this non-negativity
constraint. Not only that it genuinely refines the model, but it also allows us to
solve in closed-form a variety of economic problems.
We outline now the content and contributions of this work, and present its links
to the existing literature. First, by using some ideas from convex analysis, we solve
the constrained (i.e. with non-negative consumption) exponential utility maxi-
mization problem in a complete market setting. We show that the solution is equal
to the non-negative part of the solution associated with the unconstrained prob-
lem (see also Cox and Huang (1989) for a related problem in a continuous-time
framework). Next, we use the Kuhn-Tucker theorem to solve the preceding maxi-
mization problem in a setting of incomplete markets on a finite probability space,
and express the solution in terms of the aggregate state price density introduced
by Malamud and Trubowitz (2007). Then, we turn to analyzing heterogeneous
equilibria in the framework of complete markets. There is a vast body of literature
studying equilibrium asset prices with heterogeneous investors (see e.g. Mas-Colell
(1986), Karatzas et al. (1990, 1991), Dana (1993a, 1993b), Constantinides and
Duffie (1996), Malamud (2008)). We express the equilibrium state price density as
a ’non-smooth’ sum over indicators depending on the agents’ characteristics and
the total endowment of the economy. In effect, our finding is one of very few exam-
ples of a closed-form characterizations the equilibrium state price density. Next, we
concentrate on non-uniqueness of equilibria. Non-uniqueness is usually anticipated
in this type of models, due to the fact that the Inada condition is not fulfilled, lead-
ing to a violation of the so-called gross-substitution property (see Dana (1993a)),
which would guarantee uniqueness. However, we are not aware of any papers (apart
from Malamud and Trubowitz (2006)) that construct other examples of multiple
equilibrium state price densities in a risk-exchange economy. We then shift our
attention to studying long-run limits (see e.g. Wang (1996), Lengwiler (2005), and
Malamud (2008)) of zero coupon bonds, whose price is determined endogenously
in heterogeneous equilibrium. The main tool we employ for the preceding problem
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is Cramer’s large deviation theorem. Finally, we explore the precautionary sav-
ings motive (see Kimball (1990) for a comprehensive introduction) in incomplete
markets with exponential preferences. We verify that un-insurable future income
forces an investor to save more (or equivalently, consume less) in the present. We
examine this phenomenon in a rather general stochastic framework of incomplete
market (market of type C, see Malamud and Trubowitz (2007)), whereas most clas-
sical papers on this topic (see e.g. Dreze and Modigliani (1972) and Miller (1976))
consider markets consisting of riskless bonds.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model. In
Section 3 we establish a solution to the exponential utility maximization problem
with non-negativity constraint in both complete and incomplete markets. Section 4
analyzes the associated heterogeneous equilibrium for complete markets. In Section
5 we study the long-run behavior of equilibrium zero coupon bonds. Finally, in
Section 6 we explore the precautionary savings motive in incomplete markets.
2. Preliminaries
We consider a discrete-time market with a maturity date T . In Sections 2-4 and
Section 6, we choose T ∈ N. In Section 5, we set T = ∞. The uncertainty in our
model is captured by a probability space (Ω,F , P ) and a filtration F0 = {φ,Ω} ⊆
F1 ⊆ ... ⊆ FT = F . Adaptedness and predictability of stochastic processes is always
meant with respect to the filtration (Fk)k=0,...,T , unless otherwise stated. We use
the notation R+ = [0,∞) and R++ = (0,∞). There is no-arbitrage in the market
which consists of n risky stocks with prices processes (Sjk)k=0,...,T , j = 1, ..., n
and one riskless bond paying an interest-rate rk, at each period k = 1, ..., T. Each
price process (Sjk)k=0,...,T is non-negative and adapted, and the interest rate process
(rk)k=1,...,T is non-negative and predictable. The economy is inhabited by N (types
of) individuals, labeled by i = 1, ..., N. Each agent i receives a random income
(ǫik)k=0,...,T , which is assumed to be non-negative and adapted. The preferences
of each agent i are characterized by an impatience rate ρi ≥ 0 and an exponential
utility function ui(x) = − exp(−γix), defined on R+, for a given level of risk aversion
γi > 0. The underlying utility maximization problem from consumption of each
agent i is formulated as
(2.1) sup
(c0,...,cT )∈Bi
T∑
k=0
−e−ρikE [exp (−γick)] ,
where (ck)k=0,...,T is a consumption stream lying in a certain set of budget con-
straints Bi. As described below, we tackle problem (2.1) in both complete and
incomplete markets, under different assumptions on the model and the budget set
Bi. However, we preserve the same notations as above for both settings without
mentioning it explicitly. The market models introduced below are standard and
mainly adapted from Duffie (2001).
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2.1. Complete markets. When dealing with complete markets, the probability
space is allowed to be infinite1. The budget set Bi in this setting consists of all
non-negative adapted processes ck that satisfy the equation
(2.2)
T∑
k=0
E [ξkck] =
T∑
k=0
E
[
ξkǫ
i
k
]
.
Here, (ξk)k=0,...,T is the unique positive and normalized (ξ0 = 1) state price density
(SPD) of the market, i.e.,
Sjkξk = E
[
Sjk+1ξk+1|Fk
]
, j = 1, ..., n,
and
ξk = E [ξk+1(1 + rk+1)|Fk] ,
for k = 0, ..., T − 1. Let us stress that the completeness of the market implies
that stock prices and portfolios are not directly involved in the corresponding util-
ity maximization problem (2.1). In particular, the budget constraints are specified
through the unique SPD (see (2.2)). We introduce now the standard notion of equi-
librium in the framework of a risk-exchange economy (see e.g. Malamud (2008)),
in which portfolios and specific stocks are omitted, due to the completeness of the
market
Definition 2.1. An equilibrium is a pair of processes (cik)k=0,...,T ;i=1,...,N and
(ξk)k=1,...,T such that:
(a) The process (ξk)k=1,...,T is a SPD and (c
i
k)k=0,...,T is the optimal consumption
stream of each agent i (i.e., solving (2.1)).
(b) The market clearing condition
(2.3)
N∑
i=1
cik = ǫk :=
N∑
i=1
ǫik,
holds for all k = 0, ..., T .
2.2. Incomplete markets. We assume that the probability space is finite. Incom-
pleteness of markets is modeled standardly by allowing infinitely many SPDs. For
each k = 0, ..., T , we denote by L2(Fk) the Hilbert space of all Fk−measurable
random variables, endowed with the inner product 〈X,Y 〉 = E[XY ], X,Y ∈
L2(Fk). Each agent i selects a portfolio strategy (πjk)k=0,...,T−1, j = 1, ..., n, and
(φk)k=0,...,T−1. Here, π
j
k and φk are Fk−measurable and denote the shares in-
vested in asset j and the riskless bond at period k, respectively. We set πj−1 = 0,
j = 1, ..., n, φ−1 = 0, π
j
T = 0, j = 1, ..., n and φT = 0. The last two assumptions
1Therefore, the amount of securities completing the market might be infinite as well.
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formalize the convention that no trading is executed in the last period T . For each
k = 1, ..., T , we denote by
Lk =

n∑
j=1
πjk−1S
j
k + πk−1(1 + rk)
∣∣∣∣φk−1, πjk−1 ∈ L2 (Fk−1) , j = 1, ..., n

the wealth space at time k, and remark that L2 (Fk−1) ⊆ Lk ⊆ L2 (Fk). By
Lemma 2.5 in Malamud and Trubowitz (2007) there exists a unique normalized
SPD (Mk)k=0,...,T such that Mk ∈ Lk, for all k = 1, ..., T, called the aggregate SPD.
For incomplete markets, the budget constraints are more sophisticated than the
single constraint (2.2) arising in a complete market setting. Namely, the budget set
Bi is composed of (see Section 2 in Malamud and Trubowitz (2007)) all non-negative
adapted processes (ck)k=0,...,T of the form
(2.4) ck = ǫ
i
k +
n∑
j=1
πjk−1S
j
k + πk−1(1 + rk)−
n∑
j=1
πjkS
j
k − πk,
for all k = 0, ..., T, where (πjk)k=0,...,T−1, j = 1, ..., n, and (φk)k=0,...,T−1 is a port-
folio strategy. Notice that (2.4) can be rewritten as
(2.5) ck = ǫ
i
k +Wk − E
[
Mk+1
Mk
Wk+1
∣∣Fk] ,
where Wk ∈ Lk, k = 1, ..., T, and W0 =WT+1 = 0.
3. Optimal Consumption
3.1. Complete Markets. We investigate the utility maximization problem (2.1)
in the framework of complete markets, as specified in Subsection 2.1. We make
use of convex conjugates and other related ideas from convex analysis to derive
an explicit formula for the optimal consumption stream in this setup. As will be
shown below, there is a link between the utility maximization problem (2.1) and
the corresponding unconstrained (allowing negative consumption) version of this
problem. Hence, we first treat the latter case.
Theorem 3.1. Assume that 0 <
∑T
k=0E[ξkǫ
i
k] <∞ and −∞ < −
∑T
k=0 E[ξk log ξk],
for all i = 1, ..., N. Consider the utility maximization problem
(3.1) sup
(c0,...,cT )
T∑
k=0
−e−ρikE [exp (−γick)] ,
where (ck)k=0,...,T is an adapted process (not necessarily non-negative) that satisfies
equation (2.2). Then, there exists a unique solution given by
(3.2) c˜ik = c˜
i
k(λ˜) :=
1
γi
(
log
(
γi
λ˜
)
− ρik − log (ξk)
)
,
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for all k = 0, ..., T, where λ˜ is a positive real number specified uniquely by the
equation
(3.3)
1
γi
T∑
k=0
E
[
ξk
(
log
(
γi
λ˜
)
− ρik − log (ξk)
)]
=
T∑
k=0
E
[
ξkǫ
i
k
]
.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. First, observe that the function fi : R++ → R, fi(λ) =∑T
k=0 E
[
ξk
(
log
(
γi
λ
)− ρik − log (ξk))] is strictly monotone decreasing with limλ→0+
fi(λ) = ∞ and limλ→∞ fi(λ) = −∞. Therefore, there exists a unique solution λ˜
for equation (3.3). Next, consider the Legendre transform v˜i(y) : R++ → R of the
function −e−γix, given by v˜i(y) = supx∈R (−e−γix − xy) . Denote I˜i(y) := 1γi log
γi
y ,
and note that v˜i(y) = −e−γiI˜i(y)− I˜i(y)y. Existence now follows from the inequality
−e−ρike−γiI˜i(λ˜eρikξk) ≥ −e−ρike−γick + λ˜ξk
(
I˜i
(
λ˜eρikξk
)
− ck
)
,
which holds for all Fk−measurable random variables ck. Uniqueness follows from
the inequality v˜i(y) > −e−γix − xy, satisfied for all x 6= I˜i(y). 
Next, we solve the utility maximization problem with the non-negativity constraint.
Theorem 3.2. Assume that
∑T
k=0 E
[
ξkǫ
i
k
]
> 0. Then, the constrained utility max-
imization problem (2.1) in the setting of a complete market admits a unique solution
given by
(3.4) cik =
(
c˜ik(λ
∗)
)+
=
1
γi
(
log
( γi
λ∗
)
− ρik − log (ξk)
)+
,
where the constant λ∗ is determined as the unique positive solution of the equation
(3.5)
1
γi
T∑
k=0
E
[
ξk
(
log
( γi
λ∗
)
− ρik − log (ξk)
)+]
=
T∑
k=0
E
[
ξkǫ
i
k
]
.
We prove first the following auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 3.3. Denote Ii(y) =
1
γi
(
log
(
γi
y
))+
, and consider the function ψi :
R++ → R+ defined by
ψi(λ) =
T∑
k=0
E
[
ξkIi(λe
ρikξk)
]
.
Then, ψi(λ) is a decreasing continuous function of the following form: if ψi(b) >
0 for some b ∈ R++, then ψi(a) > ψi(b) for all 0 < a < b. Furthermore,
limλ→0+ ψi(λ) =∞ and limλ→∞ ψi(λ) = 0.
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Proof of Lemma 3.3. First observe that E [ξkIi(cξk)] <∞ for all c > 0, since
E [ξkIi(cξk)] =
1
γi
E
[
ξk log
(
γi
cξk
)
1{1≤ γicξk }
]
< 1/c,
which follows from log t < t, holding for all t ≥ 1. Therefore, ψi(λ) is well de-
fined for all λ ∈ R++. Proving the continuity of ψi is routine, and thus omit-
ted. Next, assume towards contradiction that ψi(b) > 0 and ψi(a) = ψi(b),
for some a < b. It follows that E
[
ξkIi
(
aeρikξk
)]
= E
[
ξkIi
(
beρikξk
)]
, for each
k = 0, ..., T . By definition, Ii is a strictly decreasing function on the interval (0, γi],
thus Ii
(
beρikξk
)
< Ii
(
aeρikξk
)
holds on the set {beρikξk < γi}. Since ψi(b) > 0, it
follows that there exists some k ∈ {0, ..., T } such that P [beρikξk < γi] > 0. This is
a contradiction, since {beρikξk < γi} ⊆ {aeρikξk < γi}, and thus
E
[
ξkIi
(
aeρikξk
)
1{beρikξk<γi}
]
< E
[
ξkIi
(
beρikξk
)
1{beρikξk<γi}
]
,
completing the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 3.2. The proof makes use of Lemma 3.3 and follows the
lines of the proof of Theorem 3.1. 
For sufficiently large endowments, and under some boundness assumptions on the
SPD, the optimal consumption stream is strictly positive.
Corollary 3.4. Assume that ξk < C and ǫ
i
k >
1
γi
(
log
(
C
ξk
)
+ ρi (T − k)
)
, P−a.s.,
for all k = 0, ..., T, and some constant C > 0. Then, the optimal consumption
stream of the i−th agent (see (3.4)) is strictly positive and given by
(3.6) cik =
1
γi
(∑T
l=0E
[
ξl
(
γiǫ
i
l + log ξl + ρil
)]∑T
l=0E [ξl]
− ρik − log ξk
)
> 0,
for all k = 0, ..., T .
3.2. Incomplete Markets. In the current section we deal with incomplete mar-
kets and random endowments (see Subsection 2.2). In this setting, we provide an
explicit construction of the optimal consumption for the utility maximization prob-
lem (2.1). The methods employed here rely on the Kuhn-Tucker theorem and the
notion of aggregate SPD (defined in Subsection 2.2) introduced by Malamud and
Trubowitz (2007).
Theorem 3.5. For an investor solving the utility maximization problem (2.1) in
an incomplete market, the optimal consumption stream (ĉk)k=0,...,T is uniquely de-
termined through the following scheme:
(3.7) P kL
[
e−ρikγi exp(−γiĉk) + λk
e−ρi(k−1)γi exp(−γiĉk−1) + λk−1
]
=
Mk
Mk−1
,
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for all k = 1, ..., T, where (λk)k=0,...,T is a non-negative adapted process satisfying
λk ĉk = 0,
for all k = 0, ..., T. Here, (Mk)k=0,...,T and P
k
L stand for the aggregate SPD and the
orthogonal projection on the space Lk, respectively (see Subsection 2.2).
Proof of Theorem 3.5. Consider the function
li(π, φ, λ0, ..., λT ) =
T∑
k=0
e−ρikE
− exp
−γi
ǫik + n∑
j=1
πjk−1S
j
k + φk−1(1 + rk)−
n∑
j=1
πjkS
j
k − φk

−
T∑
k=0
E
λk
ǫik + n∑
j=1
πjk−1S
j
k + φk−1(1 + rk)−
n∑
j=1
πjkS
j
k − φk
 ,
where φ = (φk)k=0,...,T−1, π = (π
j
k)k=0,...T−1, j = 1, ..., n, is a portfolio strategy
and λk ∈ L2 (Fk), k = 0, ..., T . Since our probability space is finite, we can employ
the Kuhn-Tucker theorem. Namely, by differentiating the function li with respect
to the partial derivatives φk, π
j
k, k = 0, ..., T , j = 1, ..., n, and equalizing the re-
sulting expression to 0, we get that the optimal consumption stream (ĉk)k=0,...,T is
determined by requiring that the process(
e−ρikγi exp (−γiĉk) + λk
)
k=0,...,T
is a SPD and λk ĉk = 0, k = 0, ..., T , for some non-negative adapted process
(λk)k=0,...,T . Finally, Lemma 2.5 in Malamud and Trubowitz (2007) yields the
validity of (3.7). Uniqueness follows from strict concavity. 
Remark 3.1. The Kuhn-Tucker theorem could not be applied directly for complete
markets, since we allowed for arbitrary probability spaces.
Example: one-period incomplete markets. We fix T = 1 and consider
a market of type C, introduced by Malamud and Trubowitz (2007). That is, we
assume that L1 = L2 (H1) and thus PL1 [·] = E
[·∣∣H1] , where H1 is a sigma-algebra
satisfying F0 ⊆ H1 ⊆ F1. Let ĉ0 and ĉ1 denote the optimal consumption stream
(we drop the index i). As above, λ0 and λ1 stand for the multipliers. Recall that
by (2.5), we have ĉ1 = ǫ
i
1 + Ŵ1, where Ŵ1 ∈ L1. Next, by Theorem 3.5 we get
exp
(
−γiŴ1
)
=
M1 (γi exp(−γiĉ0) + λ0)− E
[
λ1
∣∣H1]
e−ρiγiE
[
exp
(−γiǫi1) ∣∣H1] ,
hence
(3.8) ĉ1 = ǫ
i
1 + Ŵ1 =
1
γi
log
 eγiǫi1E
[
e−γiǫ
i
1
∣∣H1](
exp (ρi − γiĉ0) + λ0 eρiγi
)
M1 − eρiγi E
[
λ1
∣∣H1]
 .
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Now, denote λ = exp (ρi − γic0) + λ0 eρiγi , or equivalently ĉ0 = 1γi log
(
γi
λγie−ρi−λ0
)
.
Recall that λ0ĉ0 = 0, λ0 ≥ 0 and ĉ0 ≥ 0. Therefore, we get
(3.9) ĉ0 =
1
γi
(
log
(
1
λ
)
+ ρi
)+
.
Now, we claim that
ĉ1 =
1
γi
log
eγiǫi1E
[
e−γiǫ
i
1
∣∣H1]
λM1
 1{essinf [eγiǫi1 |H1]E[e−γiǫi1 |H1]>λM1}(3.10)
+
1
γi
log
(
eγiǫ
i
1
essinf [eγiǫ
i
1 |H1]
)
1{essinf [eγiǫi1 |H1]E[e−γiǫi1 |H1]≤λM1},
where essinf [eγiǫ
i
1 |H1] is the essential infimum of the random variable eγiǫi1 condi-
tioned on the sigma-algebraH1. To this end, assume first that eγiǫi1E
[
e−γiǫ
i
1
∣∣H1] >
λM1. Then, identity (3.8) yields ĉ1 > 0 and thus λ1 = 0, since λ1ĉ1 = 0. Thereby,
we have
λ1 = Λ1{
eγiǫ
i
1E
[
e−γiǫ
i
1
∣∣H1]≤λM1},
for some F1−measurable non-negative random variable Λ. Now, the condition
λ1ĉ1 = 0 can be rewritten as
(3.11) Λ1{
eγiǫ
i
1E
[
e−γiǫ
i
1
∣∣H1]≤λM1}×
log
 eγiǫ
i
1E
[
e−γiǫ
i
1
∣∣H1]
λM1 − eρiγi E
[
Λ1{
eγiǫ
i
1E
[
e−γiǫ
i
1
∣∣H1]≤λM1}∣∣H1
]
 = 0.
Hence, if
essinf [eγiǫ
i
1 |H1]E
[
e−γiǫ
i
1
∣∣H1] > λM1,
then ĉ1 =
1
γi
log
(
eγiǫ
i
1E
[
e−γiǫ
i
1
∣∣H1]
λM1
)
. On the other hand, we claim that if
essinf [eγiǫ
i
1 |H1]E
[
e−γiǫ
i
1
∣∣H1] ≤ λM1,
then
log
 essinf
[
eγiǫ
i
1
∣∣H1]E [e−γiǫi1∣∣H1]
λM1 − eρiγ E
[
Λ1{
eγiǫ
i
1E
[
e−γiǫ
i
1
∣∣H1]≤λM1}∣∣H1
]
 = 0.
Assume that it is not the case. It follows that
log
 eγiǫ
i
1E
[
e−γiǫ
i
1
∣∣H1]
λM1 − eρiγi E
[
Λ1{
eγiǫ
i
1E
[
e−γiǫ
i
1
∣∣H1]≤λM1}∣∣H1
]
 > 0,
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and thus by (3.11) we get
Λ1{
eγiǫ
i
1E
[
e−γiǫ
i
1
∣∣H1]≤λM1} = 0.
By substituting it back, we get
essinf [eγiǫ
i
1 |H1]E
[
e−γiǫ
i
1
∣∣H1] > λM1,
and this is a contradiction, proving the identity (3.10). Finally, let us remark that
λ is derived from the equation ĉ0 + E [M1ĉ1] = ǫ
i
0 + E
[
M1ǫ
i
1
]
. This closes the
example. 
4. Equilibrium
4.1. Existence and characterization. In the present subsection we provide a
closed-form formula for complete-market equilibrium SPDs (see Definition 2.1),
and prove existence. For this purpose we introduce the following quantities. For
each vector (λ1, ..., λN ) ∈ RN++, we define
(4.1) βi(k) = β
(λi)
i (k) =
γi
λieρik
,
for all i = 1, ..., N and all k = 0, ..., T . For a fixed k = 0, ..., T, let i1(k), ..., iN (k)
denote the order statistics of β1(k), ..., βN (k), that is, {i1(k), ..., iN (k)} = {1, ..., N}
and βi1(k)(k) ≤ ... ≤ βiN (k)(k). We set βi0(k)(k) = 0, for all k = 0, ..., T. With the
preceding notations, we denote
(4.2) ηj(k) = η
(λ1,...,λN)
j (k) =
N∑
l=j+1
log
(
βil(k)(k)
)− log (βij(k)(k))
γil(k)
≥ 0.
Note that η0(k) = +∞ and ηN (k) = 0, for all k = 0, ..., T. Lastly, we introduce a
candidate for the equilibrium SPD
(4.3) ξk (λ1, ..., λN ) =
N∑
j=1
 N∏
l=j
β
(
∑N
m=j(γil(k)/γim(k)))
−1
il(k)
exp
(
− ǫk∑N
l=j 1/γil(k)
)1{ηj(k)≤ǫk<ηj−1(k)},
for all k = 0, ..., T. Recall that Ii(y) =
(
log γiy
)+
.
Theorem 4.1. Assume that ǫik > 0 for each period k and each agent i, P−a.s.
Then, there exists an equilibrium. Furthermore, every equilibrium SPD is given by
(ξk (λ
∗
1, ..., λ
∗
N ))k=0,...,T , where λ
∗
1, ..., λ
∗
N ∈ R++ are constants solving the following
system of equations
(4.4)
T∑
k=0
E
[
ξk(λ1, ..., λN )Ii(λie
ρikξk(λ1, ..., λN ))
]
=
T∑
k=0
E
[
ξk (λ1, λ2, ..., λN ) ǫ
i
k
]
,
for i = 1, ..., N .
Exponential Utility with Non-Negative Consumption 11
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Let (cik)k=0,...,T denote the optimal consumption
stream of agent i. Recall that by (3.4) we have cik = Ii
(
λ∗i e
ρikξk
)
for some λ∗i > 0.
Plugging this into the market clearing condition (2.3), we obtain that the following
holds in equilibrium:
(4.5)
N∑
i=1
Ii
(
λ∗i e
ρikξk
)
= ǫk,
for all k = 0, ..., T . Here, λ∗1, ..., λ
∗
N are constants that will be derived from the
budget constraints in the sequel. Using the explicit form of Ii, this is equivalent to
N∑
i=1
log
( γi
γi1{λ∗i eρikξk>γi} + λ
∗
i e
ρikξk1{λ∗i eρikξk≤γi}
)1/γi = ǫk,
a further transformation yields,
N∏
i=1
(
γi1{ξk>βi(k)} + λ
∗
i e
ρikξk1{ξk≤βi(k)}
)1/γi
=
N∏
i=1
γ
1/γi
i exp(−ǫk),
where βi(k) = β
(λ∗i )
i (k) was defined in (4.1). This is equivalent to
(4.6)
N∑
j=1
Y
(k)
j 1
{
βij−1(k)(k)<ξk≤βij(k)(k)
} +
N∏
i=1
γ
1/γi
i 1{ξk>βiN (k)(k)} =
N∏
i=1
γ
1/γi
i exp (−ǫk) ,
where
Y
(k)
j =
j−1∏
l=1
γ
1/γil(k)
il(k)
N∏
l=j
(λ∗il(k))
1/γil(k) exp
k N∑
l=j
ρil(k)
γil(k)
ξk∑Nl=j 1γil(k) .
The strict-positivity assumption on the endowments implies that ξk ≤ βiN (k) holds
P−a.s. Next, for each k = 0, ..., T , we have
Y
(k)
i 1
{
βij−1(k)(k)<ξk≤βij(k)(k)
} =
N∏
i=1
γ
1/γi
i exp (−ǫk)1{βij−1(k)(k)<ξk≤βij(k)(k)
},
which implies that the following holds on each set
{
βij−1(k)(k) < ξk ≤ βij(k)(k)
}
:
ξk =
N∏
l=j
(βil(k)(k))
(
∑N
m=j γil(k)/γim(k))
−1
exp
(
− ǫk∑N
l=j 1/γil(k)
)
.
In particular, one checks that ξk ≤ βij(k)(k) is equivalent to ǫk ≥ ηj(k) and
βij−1(k)(k) < ξk is equivalent to ǫk < ηj−1(k), where, ηj(k) = η
λ∗1 ,...,λ
∗
N
j (k) is
given in (4.2). Now, one rewrites the above identity in terms of λ∗1, ..., λ
∗
N and
concludes that every equilibrium SPD is of the form (4.3) for some λ∗1, ..., λ
∗
N . Exis-
tence is standard and follows from Theorem 17.C.1 in Mas-Colell et al. (1995). 
Example: homogeneous economy. In an economy populated only by agents
of type i that hold strictly positive endowment streams (ǫik)k=0,...,T , there exists a
12 R. Muraviev and M. V. Wu¨thrich
unique (normalized) equilibrium and the corresponding homogeneous SPD process
{ξik}k=0,...,T is given by
ξik = e
γi(ǫi0−ǫik)−ρik,
for all k = 1, ..., T. The optimal consumptions obviously coincide with the endow-
ments: cik = ǫ
i
k, for all k = 0, ..., T . qed
4.2. Non-uniqueness of equilibrium.
4.2.1. Non-uniqueness with positive endowments. The system of equations (4.4) can
admit multiple solutions, causing non-uniqueness of equilibrium. This can be antic-
ipated due to the fact that the gross substitution property (which is closely related
to the absence of the Inada condition for our exponential preferences; see Defini-
tion 3.1 in Dana (1993b)) is generally violated. Otherwise this would be sufficient
for uniqueness. The next example demonstrates the existence of multiple equilibria.
Example: non-uniqueness of equilibrium. We assume a one period mar-
ket with F0 = F1 = {Ω, ∅}. Consider two agents i = 1, 2 represented by u1(x) =
u2(x) = −e−x and ρ1 = ρ2 = 0. The agents hold different endowments ǫ10, ǫ11 and
ǫ20, ǫ
2
1, respectively. Let ǫ0 and ǫ1 denote the aggregate endowments. By Theorem
4.1, every equilibrium state price density is of the form
ξ1(x, y) =
1
min{x, y}1{ǫ1<log max{x,y}min{x,y} }e
−ǫ1 +
1√
xy
1{log max{x,y}
min{x,y}
≤ǫ1}e
−ǫ1/2,
where x and y are to be determined by the budget constraints. One checks that
ξ1(x, y) =

1
eǫ1
1
x if 0 < x <
y
eǫ1 ,
1√
yeǫ1/2
1√
x
if ye−ǫ1 ≤ x ≤ yeǫ1 ,
1
yeǫ1 if x > ye
ǫ1.
The positive arguments x, y solve equations (4.4) which take the form:
(1) log(1/y)1{y≤1} + ξ1(x, y) log
(
1
yξ1(x, y)
)
1{xξ1(x,y)≤1} = ǫ
1
0 + ǫ
1
1ξ1(x, y),
(2) log(1/x)1{x≤1} + ξ1(x, y) log
(
1
xξ1(x, y)
)
1{xξ1(x,y)≤1} = ǫ
2
0 + ǫ
2
1ξ1(x, y).
Let us note that we work with a normalized state price density, i.e., ξ0 = 1. We
denote
h(x, y) = ξ1(x, y)
(
log
(
1
yξ1(x, y)
)
1{xξ1(x,y)≤1} − ǫ11
)
,
and
g(x, y) = ξ1(x, y)
(
log
(
1
xξ1(x, y)
)
1{xξ1(x,y)≤1} − ǫ21
)
.
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Observe that
h(x, y) =

−ǫ11 1eǫ1 1x if 0 < x < yeǫ1 ,
1√
yeǫ1/2
1√
x
(
log
(√
xeǫ1/2√
y
)
− ǫ11
)
if ye−ǫ1 ≤ x ≤ yeǫ1 ,
1
yeǫ1
(
ǫ1 − ǫ11
)
if x > yeǫ1 ,
and
g(x, y) =

−ǫ21 1eǫ1 1x if 0 < x < yeǫ1 ,
1√
ye−1/2ǫ1
1√
x
(
log
(√
ye1/2ǫ1√
x
)
− ǫ21
)
if ye−ǫ1 ≤ x ≤ yeǫ1 ,
1
yeǫ1
(
ǫ1 − ǫ21
)
if x > yeǫ1 .
Hence, equations (1) and (2) from above can be rewritten as
(1′) log(1/y)1{y≤1} + h(x, y) = ǫ10,
(2′) log(1/x)1{x≤1} + g(x, y) = ǫ20.
We are going to construct two solutions (x1, y1) and (x2, y2) such that yl < 1
and 0 < xl < yle
−ǫ1 , for l = 1, 2. Set ǫ11 = ǫ
2
1, e
2ǫ11−1 > ǫ11 and ǫ
1
1 < e
−1. We
start by treating equation (2′). Consider the function h(x) = log(1/x) − ǫ11eǫ1 1x
on the interval [0, ye−ǫ1], for arbitrary y > 0. Note that h′(x) > 0 for x < ǫ
1
1
eǫ1 ,
and h′(x) < 0 for x > ǫ
1
1
eǫ1 , which implies that xmax =
ǫ11
eǫ1 is a maximum of h.
Furthermore, yl (to be determined explicitly in the sequel) will satisfy ǫ
1
1 < yl,
guaranteeing that the maximum is indeed in the domain of definition of h, namely
ǫ11
eǫ1 ∈ [0, yle−ǫ1 ]. Next, note that h( ǫ
1
1
eǫ1 ) = log
(
eǫ1
ǫ11
)
−1 > 0, due to the assumption
e2ǫ
1
1−1 > ǫ11. Now let δ > 0 be some small quantity to be determined below. One
can pick ǫ20 such that the equation h(x) = ǫ
2
0 has exactly two solutions x1 and
x2 in the interval [
ǫ11
eǫ1 − δ, ǫ
1
1
eǫ1 + δ]. Now, equation (1
′) has two solutions denoted
by y1 and y2 (depending on ǫ
1
0) corresponding to x1 and x2 that are given by
yl = exp
(
−ǫ10 − ǫ
1
1
eǫ1
1
xl
)
, for l = 1, 2. Obviously, y1, y2 < 1. It is left to check that
max{xl, ǫ
2
1
eǫ1 } < yle−ǫ1 , for l = 1, 2. Since xl ∈ [ ǫ
2
1
eǫ1 − δ, ǫ
2
1
eǫ1 + δ], it suffices to verify
that ǫ11+ δe
ǫ1 < exp
(
−ǫ10 − ǫ
1
1
ǫ11−δeǫ1
)
, for an appropriate choice of δ > 0 and ǫ10. By
continuity, it suffices to prove this inequality for δ = 0 and ǫ10 = 0, which becomes
ǫ11e < 1, and follows from the assumptions imposed on ǫ
1
1. 
4.3. Non-uniqueness with vanishing endowments. In Theorem 4.1 we as-
sumed that P (ǫik > 0) = 1, for all k = 1, ..., T and all i = 1, ..., N . This assumption
was crucial for proving that every equilibrium SPD is of the form (4.3). It turns
out that once this assumption is relaxed, there necessarily exist infinitely many
equilibria, all of which of the same canonical form.
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Theorem 4.2. Assume that P (ǫk = 0) > 0, for k = 0, ..., T and P (∪Tk=0{ǫik >
0}) > 0, for i = 1, ..., N . Then, there exist infinitely many equilibria. Every
equilibrium SPD (ξ˜k)k=0,...,T is of the form
(4.7) ξ˜k(λ˜1, ..., λ˜N ) = ξk(λ˜1, ..., λ˜N )1{ǫk 6=0} +Xk1{ǫk=0},
for all k = 1, ..., T , where ξk(λ˜1, ..., λ˜N ) is given by (4.3) and Xk is some non-
negative Fk-measurable random variable. The constants λ˜1, ..., λ˜N are determined
by the budget constraints
T∑
k=0
(
E
[
ξ˜k(λ1, ..., λN ))Ii
(
λie
ρikξ˜k(λ1, ..., λN )
)]
− E
[
ξ˜k(λ1, ..., λN )ǫ
i
k
])
= 0
for i = 1, ..., N .
Proof of Theorem 4.2. The proof is identical to the proof of Theorem 4.1 apart
from a slight modification as follows. Consider equation (4.6) and note that in
the current context this equation admits the form 1{ξ˜k>βiN (k)(k)}
= 1 on the set
{ǫk = 0}, which implies that ξ˜k is of the form (4.7). 
We illustrate the above result through the following elementary example.
Example: Infinitely Many Equilibria. Let (Ω, F1, P ) be a probability space
where Ω = {ω1, ω2}, P ({ω1}), P ({ω2}) > 0, F0 = {Ω, ∅} and F1 = 2Ω. Consider
a one period homogeneous economy with an individual represented by the utility
function u(x) = −e−x and ρ = 0. The endowments of the agent are denoted by
ǫ0 and ǫ1. For the sake of transparency, we analyze the following two simple cases
directly by using the definition of equilibrium rather than by using Theorem 4.2.
(i) Let ǫ0 = 0 and ǫ1 be an arbitrary F1−measurable positive random variable.
Theorem 3.2 implies that the optimal consumption policies c0 and c1 are given by
c0 = − log
(
1{λ>1} + λ1{λ≤1}
)
and c1 = − log
(
1{λξ1>1} + λξ11{λξ1≤1}
)
. The mar-
ket clearing condition c0 = 0 and c1 = ǫ1 implies that ξ1 =
e−ǫ1
λ is an equilibrium
SPD, for all λ ≥ 1. Note that the budget constraints of the type (2.2) are evidently
satisfied. We stress that for the corresponding unconstrained problem
sup
(c0,c1)
−e−c0 − E[e−c1 ],
where c0 ∈ R and c1 ∈ L2 (F1) are such that c0 + E[ξ1c1] = ǫ0 + E[ξ1ǫ1], there
exists a unique equilibrium corresponding to λ = 1, that is, ξ1 = e
−ǫ1 .
(ii) Let ǫ0 > 0 be arbitrary, ǫ1(ω1) > 0 and ǫ1(ω2) = 0. Then, by Theorem 3.2 we
obtain that c0 = log(1/λ) = ǫ0 and c1 = max{log( 1λξ1 ), 0} = ǫ1. It follows that
λ = e−ǫ0, and that there are infinitely many equilibrium state price densities of the
form ξ1(y) = e
ǫ0−ǫ11{ǫ1 6=0} + y1{ǫ1=0}, one for every y > e
ǫ0 . 
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5. Long-run yields of zero coupon bonds
In this section we work with a complete market and an infinite time horizon
(T = ∞). We emphasize that all our results in the context of equilibrium hold
in this setting, due to a specific choice of the aggregate endowment process (see
(5.3)). Recall that ξk = ξk(λ1, ..., λN ), k ∈ N is the equilibrium SPD (see (4.3)).
The equilibrium price at time 0 of a zero coupon bond maturing at period t ∈ N is
defined by
(5.1) Bt = E [ξt] .
Based on Cramer’s large deviation theorem, we study the asymptotic behavior (as
t→∞) of the yield at time 0, defined by
(5.2) Y (0, t) := − logB
t
t
.
The weights λ1, ..., λN are omitted here since they have no impact on the latter
limit. Throughout this section we assume that the total endowment process in the
economy is a random walk with drift, i.e.,
(5.3) ǫk =
k∑
j=1
Xj ,
for all k ∈ N, where X0 = 0 and X1, X2, ... are non-negative i.i.d random variables
with a finite mean E[X1] > 0.
5.1. Heterogeneous risk-aversion. Consider an economy where agents differ
only with respect to the risk-aversion, that is, γ1 < ... < γN , ǫ
i
k = ǫk/N, i = 1, ..., N ,
k ∈ N; ρ1 = ... = ρN = ρ. Recall (4.1) and note that in the present setting, equa-
tions (4.4) can be rewritten as
(5.4)
∞∑
k=0
E
[
ξk (log (βi(k))− log ξk)+
]
=
γi
N
∞∑
k=0
E [ξkǫk] .
Now, let i, j ∈ {1, ..., N} be arbitrary. Notice that the homogeneity of the impa-
tience rate among agents implies that either βi(k) ≤ βj(k), or βi(k) ≥ βj(k), for
all k ∈ N. Therefore, by (5.4) we conclude that β1(k) < ... < βN (k) for all k ∈ N
and thus il(k) = l, for all l = 1, ..., N. Hence, we get (see (4.2))
ηj = log
((
λj
γj
)1/γj+1+...+1/γN (γj+1
λj+1
)1/γj+1
...
(
γN
λN
)1/γN)
,
for all j = 1, ..., N , and (see (4.3))
ξk =
N∑
j=1
N∏
l=j
(
γl
λleρk
)(∑Nm=j γlγm )−1
exp
(
− ǫk∑N
l=j 1/γl
)
1{ηj≤ǫk<ηj−1},
for all k ∈ N.
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Theorem 5.1. In economies with heterogeneous risk-aversions, we have
lim
t→∞−
logBt
t
= ρ− logE
[
exp
(
− X1∑N
l=1 1/γl
)]
.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. First, we evidently have
− logB
t
t
≤ −
logE
[∏N
l=1
(
γl
λleρt
)(∑Nm=1 γlγm )−1
exp
(
− ǫt∑N
l=1 1/γl
)
1{η1≤ǫt<η0}
]
t
.
Next, note that the law of large numbers implies that limt→∞ P (a ≤ ǫt ≤ b) = 0,
for all 0 ≤ a ≤ b, and limt→∞ P (c ≤ ǫt) = 1, for any 0 ≤ c. Therefore, since
η0 =∞, we get
−
logE
[
N
∏N
l=1
(
γl
λleρt
)(∑Nm=1 γlγm )−1
exp
(
− ǫt∑N
l=1 1/γl
)
1{η1≤ǫt<η0}
]
t
≤ − logB
t
t
,
for sufficiently large t. It is left to prove that
lim
t→∞
−
logE
[
exp
(
− ǫt∑N
l=1 1/γl
)
1{η1≤ǫt<η0}
]
t
= − logE
[
exp
(
− X1∑N
l=1 1/γl
)]
.
First, observe that
lim
t→∞
−
logE
[
exp
(
− ǫt∑N
l=1 1/γl
)
1{η1≤ǫt<η0}
]
t
≥ lim
t→∞
−
logE
[
exp
(
− ǫt∑N
l=1 1/γl
)]
t
= − logE
[
exp
(
− X1∑N
l=1 1/γl
)]
.
On the other hand, we have
−
logE
[
exp
(
− ǫt∑N
l=1 1/γl
)
1{η1≤ǫt<η0}
]
t
≤ −
logE
[
exp
(
− ǫt∑N
l=1 1/γl
)
1{η1t ≤X1}...1{
η1
t ≤Xt}
]
t
= − logE
[
exp
(
− X1∑N
l=1 1/γl
)
1{η1t ≤X1}
]
.
Lastly, dominated convergence yields
lim
t→∞
− logE
[
exp
(
− X1∑N
l=1 1/γl
)
1{η1t ≤X1}
]
= − logE
[
exp
(
− X1∑N
l=1 1/γl
)]
,
completing the proof. 
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5.2. Heterogeneous impatience rates. Consider an economy which is composed
of agents who differ only with respect to the impatience rates, that is, γ1 = ... =
γN = γ; ǫ
i
k = ǫk/N, i = 1, ..., N , k = 1, 2, ...; ρN < ... < ρ1. Let λ1, ..., λN be the
weights corresponding to the equilibrium SPD ξk = ξk(λ1, ..., λN ), k ∈ N. Note
that there exists t′ ∈ N such that λ1eρ1t > .... > λNeρN t, for all t > t′. Therefore,
by recalling (4.1) we get il(t) = l for all t > t
′, and consequently (see (4.2) and
(4.3)), we have
(5.5) ηj(t) =
1
γ
N∑
l=j+1
log(βl/βj) =
1
γ
N∑
l=j+1
log(λj/λl) +
1
γ
N∑
l=j+1
(ρj − ρl)t,
for all j = 1, ..., N, and
ξt = γ
N∑
j=1
(λj ...λN )
−(N−j+1)−1 exp
(
−ρj + ...+ ρN
N − j + 1 t−
γ
N − j + 1 ǫt
)
×1{ηj(t)≤ǫt<ηj−1(t)},
for all t > t′. Consider the logarithmic moment generating function of X1
Λ(x) = logE
[
eλX1
]
,
and denote by
Λ∗(y) = sup
x∈R
(xy − Λ(y)) ,
the corresponding Legendre transform of Λ. We set
aj = ρj + inf
x∈[ 1γ
∑
N
l=j+1(ρj−ρl), 1γ
∑
N
l=j(ρj−1−ρl)]
Λ∗(x),
bj = ρj−1 + inf
x∈( 1γ
∑N
l=j+1(ρj−ρl), 1γ
∑N
l=j(ρj−1−ρl))
Λ∗(x),
for j = 2, ..., N, and
a1 = ρ1 + inf
x∈[ 1γ
∑N
l=2(ρ1−ρl),∞)
Λ∗(x).
We are ready to state the main result of this subsection.
Theorem 5.2. In economies with heterogeneous impatience rates, we have
(5.6) lim sup
t→∞
− logB
t
t
≤ min {b2, ..., bN} ,
and
(5.7) lim inf
t→∞
− logB
t
t
≥ min {a1, ..., aN} .
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Proof of Theorem 5.2. Observe that the following inequality is satisfied
ξt ≤ γ
N∑
j=1
(λj ...λN )
−(N−j+1)−1 exp
(
− 1
N − j + 1 ((ρj + ...+ ρN ) t+ γηj(t))
)
×1{ηj(t)≤ǫt<ηj−1(t)} ≤ γ
N∑
j=1
(λj)
−1 exp (−ρjt)1{ηj(t)≤ǫt<ηj−1(t)},
for all t > t′. Denote aj(t) := (λj)−1 exp (−ρjt)1{ηj(t)≤ǫt<ηj−1(t)}. We have
lim inf
t→∞
− logB
t
t
≥ lim inf
t→∞
− logE[
∑N
j=1 aj(t)]
t
≥ lim inf
t→∞
log
(
1
(N max{E [a1(t)] , ..., E [aN (t)]})1/t
)
= lim inf
t→∞
log
(
1
(max{E [a1(t)] , ..., E [aN (t)]})1/t
)
= lim inf
t→∞
min
{
log
(
1
(E [a1(t)])
1/t
)
, ..., log
(
1
(E [aN (t)])
1/t
)}
= min
{
lim inf
t→∞ log
(
1
(E [a1(t)])
1/t
)
, ..., lim inf
t→∞ log
(
1
(E [aN (t)])
1/t
)}
.
Fix an arbitrary ε > 0. Next, recall (5.5) and observe that the following inequality
holds true for each j ∈ {1, ..., N}.
(5.8) lim inf
t→∞
− logE [aj(t)]
t
= ρj + lim inf
t→∞
− logP (ηj(t) ≤ ǫt < ηj−1(t))
t
≥ ρj + lim inf
t→∞ −
logP
(
1
γ
∑N
l=j+1(ρj − ρl)− ε ≤ ǫt ≤ 1γ
∑N
l=j(ρj−1 − ρl) + ε
)
t
≥ ρj + inf
x∈[ 1γ
∑N
l=j+1(ρj−ρl)−ε, 1γ
∑N
l=j(ρj−1−ρl)+ε]
Λ∗(x),
where in the last inequality we have employed Cramer’s large deviation theorem
(see e.g. Theorem 2.2.3 in Dembo and Zeitouni (1998)). Since ε > 0 was arbitrary,
we conclude that
lim inf
t→∞
− logE[aj(t)]
t
≥ ρj + inf
x∈[ 1γ
∑
N
l=j+1(ρj−ρl), 1γ
∑
N
l=j(ρj−1−ρl)]
Λ∗(x).
The preceding inequalities combined with (5.8) prove the validity of (5.7). On the
other hand, we have
ξt(λ1, ..., λN ) ≥
γ
N∑
j=2
(λj ...λN )
−(N−j+1)−1 exp
(
− 1
N − j + 1 ((ρj + ...+ ρN ) t+ γηj−1(t))
)
×1{ηj(t)≤ǫt<ηj−1(t)} ≥ γ
N∑
j=2
(λj−1)−1 exp (−ρj−1t)1{ηj(t)≤ǫt<ηj−1(t)}.
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Finally, inequality (5.6) follows analogously. 
6. Precautionary savings
This section deals with precautionary savings, namely, savings resulted by future
uncertainty. When markets are complete, one would not anticipate this phenom-
enon to occur, since in essence, all risks can be hedged. Thus, we concentrate
on incomplete markets. Here, as commonly referred to in the literature (see e.g.
Carroll and Kimball (2008)), savings should be understood literally as less con-
sumption. We consider a one-period incomplete market of type C, as in Subsection
3.2.1, and stick to the same notation. The only distinction is the particular speci-
fication of the random endowments. Let X ∈ L2 (F1) be an arbitrary non-negative
random variable. Denote by
(6.1) ǫ1 = ǫ1(ε) :=
eεX
E
[
eεX
∣∣H1] ,
the endowment of the agent at time T = 1, for some ε ∈ [0, 1].Note that E [ǫ1(ε)∣∣H1]
= 1, and ǫ1 = 1 in case that X ∈ L2 (H1) or in case that the market is complete
(i.e., if F1 = H1). As shown in the next statement, the variance of ǫ1(ε) is an
increasing function of ε.
Lemma 6.1. The conditional variance on H1 of the random variable ǫ1(ε) is an
increasing function of ε, namely, the function
V ar
[
ǫ1(ε)
∣∣H1] = E [(ǫ1(ε)− E [ǫ1(ε)∣∣H1])2 ∣∣H1] ,
satisfies the inequality
V ar
[
ǫ1(ε1)
∣∣H1] ≤ V ar [ǫ1(ε2)∣∣H1] ,
P − a.s., for all ε1 ≤ ε2.
Proof of Lemma 6.1. First note that
V ar
[
ǫ1(ε)
∣∣H1] = E [e2εX ∣∣H1](
E
[
eεX
∣∣H1])2 − 1.
To complete the proof, it suffices to show that the corresponding differential is
non-negative. One checks that it holds if and only if
E
[
Xe2εX |H1
]
E
[
eεX |H1
]− E [e2εX |H1]E [XeεX |H1] ≥ 0.
To see this, consider the measure Q defined by the Radon-Nykodym derivative
dQ
dP
=
e2εX
E [e2εX |H1] ,
and note that the above inequality is equivalent to
EQ
[
X
∣∣H1]EQ [e−εX ∣∣H1] ≥ EQ [Xe−εX∣∣H1] .
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The latter inequality follows from the FKG (see Fortuin et al. (1971)) inequality,
since it can be rephrased as
EQ
[
f(X)
∣∣H1]EQ [g(X)∣∣H1] ≥ EQ [f(X)g(X)∣∣H1] ,
where f(x) = x is increasing and g(x) = e−εx is decreasing. 
According to Lemma 6.1, the parameter ε ∈ [0, 1] quantifies the degree of income
uncertainty. More precisely, an increase in ε yields an increase in the variance of
the income, but preserves the mean. Therefore, we learn that the un-insurability
of income is an increasing function of the parameter ε. Recall the explicit formulas
(see (3.9) and (3.10)) for the optimal consumption stream in the current setting.
One can show (similarly to Corollary 3.4) that by choosing a sufficiently large ǫ0
(the initial endowment), the corresponding optimal consumption stream coincides
with the unconstrained one, and it is given by
(6.2) ĉ0(ε) =
1
γ
(
log
(
1
λ(ε)
)
+ ρ
)
,
and
(6.3) ĉ1(ε) =
1
γ
log
(
eγǫ1(ε)E
[
e−γǫ1(ε)
∣∣H1]
M1
)
+ ĉ0(ε)− 1
γ
ρ,
where λ(ε) (or equivalently, ĉ0(ε)) solves uniquely the equation
(6.4) ĉ0(ε) + E [M1ĉ1(ε)] = ǫ0 + E [M1ǫ1(ε)] .
We are ready to state the main result of the section.
Theorem 6.2. The precautionary savings motive holds true. Namely, ĉ0(ε) is a
decreasing function of ε. Hence, in particular, investors consume less in the present,
as the variance of future-income increases.
Proof of Theorem 6.2. First, it is possible to rewrite constraint (6.4) as
ĉ0(ε) (1 + E [M1]) +
1
γ
E
[
M1 logE
[
e−γǫ1(ε)
∣∣H1]] = K,
where K := ργE [M1] + ǫ0 +
1
γE [M1 logM1] is a constant not depending on ε.
Obviously, ĉ0(ε) is a differentiable function of ε. We get
∂ĉ0
∂ε
=
1
1 + E [M1]
E
[
M1
E
[
e−γǫ1(ε) ∂ǫ1∂ε
∣∣H1]
E
[
e−γǫ1(ε)
∣∣H1]
]
,
where the differential of ǫ1(ε) is given by (see (6.1))
∂ǫ1
∂ε
=
XeεX
E
[
eεX
∣∣H1] − e
εXE
[
XeεX
∣∣H1](
E
[
eεX
∣∣H1])2 .
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Therefore, to complete the proof, it suffices to check that E
[
e−γǫ1(ε) ∂ǫ1∂ε
∣∣H1] ≤ 0.
This boils down to proving
E
[
XeεXe−γǫ1(ε)
∣∣H1]E [eεX ∣∣H1] ≤ E [e−γǫ1(ε)eεX ∣∣H1]E [XeεX ∣∣H1] .
Set a new measure Q given by the Radon-Nykodym derivative dQdP :=
eεX
E
[
eεX
∣∣H1] ,
and note that by dividing the preceding inequality by
(
E
[
eεX
∣∣H1])2, we arrive at
EQ
[
Xe−γǫ1(ε)
∣∣H1] ≤ EQ [e−γǫ1(ε)∣∣H1]EQ [X∣∣H1] .
By (6.1), we have X =
(
log ǫ1(ε) + logE
[
eεX
∣∣H1]) 1ε . Therefore, the required in-
equality admits the form
EQ
[
e−γǫ1(ε) log ǫ1(ε)
∣∣H1] ≤ EQ [e−γǫ1(ε)∣∣H1]EQ [log ǫ1(ε)∣∣H1] ,
which follows from the FKG inequality, as in Lemma 6.1. 
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